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Nationalism, Ethnicity,'-:~and
the Cultural Politics of Identity
by David William Cavers.
In recent decades nations and nationalism
have become increasingly important topics 'of
interest in anthropology. This is likely the result of
the fact that the people that were traditionally
studied by anthropologists are now in control of the
state apparatus left to them by colonial regimes.
and because anthropology has also recently taken
more interest in communities of European origin.
Work on nations and nationalism has
brought up many interesting and innovative points
about culture change and production. and about
ideology. However. work on nationalism has
suffered in its analytical usefulness due to an
artificial differentiation between nations and
nationalism on the one hand. and other "imagined
communities" (Anderson 1991) and "primordial
sentiments" (Geertz 1973). in particular ethnic
groups and ethnicity. on the other hand (e.g.
Anderson 1991, Gellner 1983). This differentiation
is based on the assumption that there is something
intrinsically unique in the nature of the
phenomena labeled nations and nationalism that
excludes them from being studied in relation to
ethnic groups and ethnicity. Dissolving this
artificial differentiation is both theoretically and
practically important. Theoretically. work on
nationalism (e.g. Anderson 1991. Foster 1991,
Spencer 1990a & b) and work on ethnicity (e.g.
Barth 1969. Cohen 1974. Moore 1989) can each
benefit from the insights that the other has into the
phenomena covered under those same titles.
Practically. the study of nationalism would benefit
from an integration with the study of ethnicity in
that. contrary to what Benedict Anderson would
have us believe. we do not live "in a world in which
the nation-state is the overwhelming norm"
(1991:135) nor do we live in a world in which
nation-states will inevitably become the norm. as
Gellner would have us believe (1983).A quick review
of Rand McNally's "Gazetteer of the World" (1983)
demonstrates that we live in a world in which
nations are not coterminous with state boundaries.
The relations of the state and its people are tied to
relations with. and between. other foci of
"primordial sentiments" (Geertz 1973). "imagined
communities" (Anderson 1991) and "imagined life
possibilities" (Appadurai I 99 I ) .
Several 'anthropologists have recently
produced works that help in illuminating the
intricacies of the relations alluded to above. Uhf
Hannerz (1987. 1989a & b. 1992) and AIjun
Appadurai (1991) have contributed to the
understanding of the interplay of local and
.A transregional culture, while Usa Malkki (1992) and
Richard Fox (1991) have contributed to disrupting
the often implicit understanding that states and
nations are co-extensive. '
Both nations,' as Gellner and Anderson
identify them, and ethnic groups are "imaginec
communities" that act as mters. providing ways of
visualising.interpreting. and making sense 01
"transnational cultural flows" (Hannerz 1989b:200:
and "imagined life possibilities" (Appaduraj
1991:200). They are also social organisations that
provide symbols of identity and the potential for
acceptable and credible civil authority over larg(:
populations. The ability to make authority credible
and to act as cultural mediators between the loca:
and the global differentiates nations and ethnic.
groups from "imagined communities" of Coca-Cole
drinkers and CNN watchers. which have onl)
limited potential as bases for solidarity. Here. I
hope to demonstrate that the roles of nationalisrr
and ethnicity in these relations are such that the)
should not' be "'analysed as distinct orders oj
phenomena. Rather, in order to understand the
roles of nationalism and ethnicity in the dynamicf
of lo'cal and gIobal"cultural flow" and cwtura'-.
politics they must be understood as integrall)
linked phenomena. •....
In the first section of this essay I will discusf
certain problems ,with the separation 0:
nationalism 'and ethnicity. and in the seconc'
section I will demonstrate the utility Of
understanding these phenomena as linked. usin~
the development of nationalist organisations ir
modem Nigeria as an example.- .'
,.'Several ..social 'scientists identify" the
symbols of the nation with· those of the state. ane
perceive the state to be integral to the nation (e.g
Anderson J991 ,'; Foster 1991. Williams 1989)
According to >Foster, Lofgren identifies ar
"intemationally'approved check-list of ingredienu
necessary to form a nation. These include ...not onI:
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flags and anthems. but also ideas about national
history and landscape. and specific institutions
such as national museums and educational
systems" (Foster 1991:252). The concentration on
the sYmbols of the state in understanding the
symbols of nationalism neglects the importance of
SYmbolsof nationalism that correspond to sYmbols
used in ethnic identification of the dominant
culture group in a state. This concentration on
symbols that are. I expect. more important as
symbols of identification in the international
community than to the people of a nation or state
distorts the nature of nationalism by presupposing
that it is of a different order than ethnicity.
For Benedict Anderson a nation is an
imagined community that is opposed to two other
forms of social organisation: the dynastic realm
and the religious community. The nation's
distinctive features are that whereas these other
forms are hierarchical and centripetal. the nation
is imagined as horizontal and boundary oriented
(Anderson 1991: 15). In "A Class Act" Brackette
Williams provides a relatively simple
differentiation between nationalism and ethnicity
(although the language she uses goes a long way to
conceal that simplicity): .
In sum. ethnicity labels the visibility of that
aspect of identity formation process that is
produced by and subordinated to nationalist
programs and plans - plans intent on
creating putative homogeneity out of
heterogeneity through the appropriate
processes of transformist hegemony (1989:
439).
Williams argues that a nation consists of that
social formation that identifies itself with the
dominant ideology and culture of a state. Ethnic
groups. then. are those social formations that exist
within that same state and are subordinate. and in
opposition. to the nation. An ethnic group becomes
a nation through the process of acquiring a state
that it may ideologically doniinate. This type of
definition is consistent with lay ideas about ethnic
groups in North America. That is. ethnic groups are
those sets of people who are perceived by the
dominant group to be culturally atypical.
The understanding of nations as distinct
forms of socio-political organisation. as
exemplified by Anderson and Williams. creates
problems of a transitional nature. That is. it
problematises the point at which an ethnic group
becomes a nation. An example of this problem
should be sufficient to illustrate the confusion
caused by such a definition. Each of the three major
ethnic groups in Nigeria. the Igbo. Hausa-Fulani
and the Yoruba are culturally. politically and
demographically dominant within particular
regions of Nigeria: the east. north and west.
respectively. None of these groups were. in the
1960s. culturally. politically or demographically
dominant in Nigeria as a whole. Therefore. in
looking at Nigeria as a whole. they were all ethnic
groups rather than nations. After independence in
1960. each of these three regions constituted states
within a federation and the political parties that
ran the govemments within these Regions 'Were
supported and dominated by the regional ethnic
majorities. Considering this situation with
reference to the understandings of the constitution
of nations as described above. the Igbo-Eastem
Region. Hausa-Fulani-Northem Region and the
Yoruba-Westem Region. would constitute nations
within their Regions. Groups such as the Ijaw. Tiv
and Edo would constitute ethnic groups in these
Regions. respectively. All three of these ethnic
groups did eventually acquire states within which
they were the dominant groups. Would they. then be
nations?
In 1966. after the Hausa-Fulani leaders of
Nigeria's First Republic had been assassinated in
Nigeria's first coup. much of the Hausa-Fulani
population was in favour of the secession of the
Northem Region of Nigeria. however. problems
with minorities in the north lead the Hausa-Fulani
leaders to back away from this position (Hatch
1970:281-283). During the same period of turmoil.
anti-Igbo rioting in the Northem Region and the
assassination of the recently installed Igbo leader
of Nigeria culminated in the secession of the Igbo
dominated Eastem Region from Nigeria as the
Republic of Biafra. Under Williams' model. would
the Igbo be considered a nation and the
Hausa-Fulani an ethnic group. once Biafra was
independent? It should be noted that upon the
secession of Biafra. Nigeria was enveloped by a war
between federal and Biafran forces. The federal
army. and the military govemment. were almost
entirely dominated by northemers. and in
particular. Hausa-Fulani. Under these conditions
the Hausa-Fulani could be seen to be the dominant
culture group in Nigeria. therefore they too would be
a nation-. However the United Nations did not
recognize Biafra as an independent state. therefore
possibly. the Hausa-Fulani were now a nation but
the Igbowere not.
This example should demonstrate that. if
William's differentiation between nations and
states is used. then there are no intrinsic defining
features that make a nation different from an
ethnic group. The difference is in the decision by
others to grant the legitimacy of a state in which a
particular ethnic group is dominant. The undue
concentration on the link between the state and
nationalism relies far too heavily on the United
Nations' or other external organisations'
designation of legitimate state status. This cannot
be a useful distinction in the anthropological
analysis of such units. The above example would
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suggest that ethnicity and nationalism are not
different orders of phenomena in any essential
way. Rather. they are temporally. structurally and
perspectively contingent. and are analytically of
the same order.
Kapferer (Spencer 1990a:293) and Handler
(1985) identify nations that are not dominant
within a sovereign state. but do however identify
with a region of that state as a homeland. Coplan
describes nationalism among the Sotho as
identifying with a territory larger than Lesotho
(1992); in a like manner Somali nationalism in the
1970s identified with an area that extended beyond
the boarders of Somalia into Ethiopia. Kenya and
Djibouti. If that territoriality is an aspect of
nationalism. it would appear that boundaries and
state dominance are not necessary components.
Rather. it is the conception. on the parts of the
members of the nation. of having a homeland.
Whether or not these homelands are actually
dominated by. or even occupied by. the members of
the nation is less important. In fact. the lack of
dominance may incite stronger nationalist
sentiment than dominance will. Quebecois
nationalism In Canada. Sotho nationalism in
South Mrica (Coplan 1992). Catalonian and Basque
nationalism In Spain. Tamil nationalism in Sri
Lanka. Palestinian nationalism In Israel and Hutu
nationalism In Burundi (Malkki 1990) exemplify
this. as does Eritrea's recently successful struggle
for separation from Ethiopia.
If nations cannot adequately be
differentiated for analytical purposes from ethnic
groups on the basis of identification with the state.
we must then tum to another focus to find a
distinctive characteristic that would make nations
of a different order than ethnic groups.
One focus of attention for several authors
has been the identification of an essentialised
common national unity. Anderson (1991) claims
that the nation is imagined as an horizontal. as
opposed to an hierarchical. social organisation.
One can imagine that a nation could be horizontal
L1'1 Lhat everymember of it is equally a member of it.
however. this causes problems In several ways.
Even in Anderson's exemplary nation. the U.S.A.. it
is obvious that differences of race. age. class and
gender have always been understood to be the basis
of hierarchy. Certainly those members of the
population that are taken to symbolize it by
position or charisma (e.g. George Washington. the
Queen of England. the King of Lesotho) are not
considered to be citizens of the nation on the same
level as the 'average citizen'. "Hindian" nationalism
is. according to Fox. based on ideas that stem from
Hindu and Indian traditions that cannot be
considered liberal or egalitarian. such as the caste
system (Fox 1990b). Kapferer depicts Anzac and
Sinhalese nationalism (1988. 1989) as distinct
types of nationalism. Anzac nationalism is of an
egalitarian type that is anti-state. whereas
Sinhalese nationalism is based on an hierarchical
ideology derived from Buddhism and Sinhalese
cultural traditions. The importance on
hierarchical features in nationalism noted above
disrupts the differentiation Anderson makes
between nations. imperial realms and religious
communities.
'The imagining of a common identity is an
important aspect of national identity. however it
cannot be considered to distinguish a nation in any
significant way from other "imagined
communities" (Anderson 1991) such as ethnic
groups and religious communities that are the foci
of "primordial sentiments" (Geertz 1973). For
example. all Muslims share a unity that is
horizontal rather than hierarchical in that
Muslims can imagine all the members of their
religious community facing Mecca at the same time
every day. Max Gluckman's understanding of "the
reasonable man" In the Barotse judicial system
demonstrates that ethnic groups have "imagined
communities" (1955). as does Fredrik Barth's
understanding of ethnic groups' providing rules for
judgment of behaviour from which "others" arf
exempt (1969:14).The "imagined community" is nOl
a distinctive characteristic of nations. however it
points to the fact that nations have idealisec
stereotypes of themselves that are essentialist. FOl
example. America is often essentialised as the lane
of freedom and opportunity where everyone has
equal rights. An example from Nigeric
demonstrates that 'ethnic groups' also have these
essentialist stereotypes of themselves. and others:
One day three men set off on a jaunt. Soor;
they come (sic) to a wild mango tree lader
with well-ripened fruits. "Allah be praised'
exclaimed the Hausaman. "How nice it wil.
be for me to share these fruits with my kitt
and kin." The Yorubaman felt the same. ";
will take these to my wife and children." he
said. But the Igboman said nothing. he wa~
.b!1~_~~~k.fng~uthow much money he coule
make it he picked the whole tree and tool
the crop to market. (Uguru and Ezeh 1988:34'
One day a Hausaman. Yoruhaman and ar
Igho set oft on a trip and came across a wile
mango tree laden with truit. The Hausamar
said These truit look lovely let us pray tha
Allah makes them fall tor us.' And tht'
Yorubaman said. 'I will go home and sed
the help of my kinsmen to help me climh uI
and pick some.' The Igboman simply rollee.
up his sleeves. climbed the tree and afte'
much sweat and toil picked the lot, but wher
he climbed back onto the ground he foull<
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his two friends were already arguing and
politicking ahout sharing the harvest.
(Uguruand Ezeh 1988:34)
This example demonstrates, inter alia. particular
essentialist characteristics of three ethnic groups.
The Igbo are considered to be entrepreneurial by
nature. Hausa identity is strongly tied to Islam and
Yoruba identity is strongly linked with the lineage
system. Thus. we can see that the essentialisation of
characteristics of a community does not
distinguish nations from ethnic groups but rather
is integral to both of them.
The essentialisation of the nation.
producing the appearance of homogeneity among
heterogeneous people, is dependent on the use of
symbols of commonalty and the understanding of a
common history. Spencer (1990a and b), Williams
(1990), Kapferer (1989). Anderson (1991) and other
authors discuss nationalism as an essentialising
ideology or process. by which people create
stereotypes of themselves and others. with the use
of symbols. These ideas about the importance of
symbols of commonalty can be related to Cohen's
theorisations on the use of old symbols for new
purposes. and new symbols for old purposes in
ethnicity (1974). The particular symbols that are
used may vary from nation to nation. however they
serve the same purposes. This is also true for ethnic
groups. Apple pie. GeorgeWashington. freedom and
the American flag symbolise American identity;
. the tank, temple and paddy field symbolise Sinhala
identity (Spencer 1990a:286); the lineage, Obas. lle
Ife, Orisa and Oduduwa symbolise Yoruba identity;
egalitarianism, chi, 'Zik' and "getting up" (Uchendu
1965:34-38) symbolise Igbo identity and Islam.
Hausa language. Usuman Dan Fodio and the
Caliphate of Sokoto symbolise Hausa-Fulani
identity. Each of these examples are only samples
of symbolic figures or features of these groups.
however, they should be sufficient to demonstrate
that there is little reason to distinguish between the
significance and use of these by designating some of
these groups as ethnic groups and others as nations.
Many authors point out that nations are
identified with histories or traditions that provide
the members of the nation with the sense of a
common past (e.g.Handler 1985, Spencer 1990a and
b. Anderson 1991). Here too we find that this is not
only applicable to nations but to ethnic groups as
well. The origin myths of the Yoruba descent from
Oduduwa at lIe Ife and the tradition of their kings'
authority stemming from the Oni (king) of Ife
provide the Yoruba with a sense of a common past
and identity no less than the tartans and bagpipes
of the Scottish Highlanders provide a sense of
cQ.mmonpast and identity for Scots.
. The difficulties in differentiating
nationalism from ethnicity and in understanding
it as an essential social formation are
demonstrated by Kapferer (Spencer 1990a) and Fox
(1990a). Both of these anthropologists have chosen
to abandon essentialised characterisations of what
nationalism is. but in different ways. Kapferer
claims that nationalism cannot be reduced to one
form:
... 1 do not think that diverse nationalist
ideologies boil down to the same thing.
Maybe they are arguments in the same
world. but sometimes they are only in the
most trivial sense about the same thing. like
"identity" and "belonging."as Spencer states.
They can only be so if they are treated as
empty categories and devoid of significant
content ..." (Spencer 1990a:293)
Richard Fox claims that nationalism is one of
many terms that are used to designate a much
broader cultural phenomenon:
I use the phrase "nationalist ideologies" to
refer to sets of cultural meanings that are
labeled "nationalisms." "sub national
identities." and "ethnic nationalisms" ...
nationalist ideologies commonly get termed
"racial identities." "ethnicities." or
"subnationalisms." The variety of terms
now in use obscures what we take to be better
understood as a single phenomenon: the
production of ideologies of peoplehood. that
is ideologies of common C'national") culture.
(Fox 1990a:2-3).
Taking into account the insight provided by
Kapferer. there is no reason to consider Fox's
"nationalist ideologies" as a single phenomenon.
Instead. it is better to regard Fox's phrase as a
broader label for a range of phenomena that cannot
be distinguished from each other by essentialist
labels and are therefore better considered under a
label that is more inclusive and malleable. Under
this title the contributors to Fox's Nationalist
Ideologies and· the Produ.-tl.on-oj National Cultures
(1990a) discuss such diverse phenomena as
"nationalism" in Hutu refugee camps in Tanzania
(Malkki 1990). the production and display of
"nationalist" identity among Iranian Jews in Israel
(Goldstein 1990). nationalism in Guyana (Williams
1990) and the rise of Hindu consciousness in
contemporary India (Fox 1990b). What then is it
that makes it reasonable to discuss these diverse
phenomena under the same heading? What is "the
production of ideologies of peoplehood. that is,
ideologies of common ("national") culture" (Fox
1990a:3) and is this what really binds these
phenomena together?· .
Having questioned the idea that
nationalism is a discrete phenomenon, distinct in
an essential way from ethnicity. and having
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rejected its necessary connection with the state, it is
possible to come to some understanding of the types
of phenomena that are delineated by nationalism
and similar terms without being reduced to
Seton-Watson's statement:
All that I can find to say is that a nation
exists when a significant number of people
in a community consider themselves to
form a nation, or behave as if they formed
one
(Spencer 1990:283)
From the insights into the nature of nations and
nationalism gained in the above discussion, it is
possible to describe nations in a way that gives at
least a tentative depiction of their characteristics.
Nations, and ethnic groups, are imagined
communities that are both cultural and political in
nature. This separates them from states, which are
political and economic in nature. They are
identified with unitary, essentialised, and
essentialising ideologies and unique histories,
understood as common to, and possessed by the
members of nations. These nations are perceived,
by their members, to be unique and discrete units
that identify with a territorial homeland and other
symbols of common identity. Identification with
these imagined communities, their symbols and
social organisations, provides individuals with
frameworks that help them to negotiate the
dynamics of global and local cultural and political
systems.
In understanding any ideology-we need to
differentiate in principle between the
circumstances of its production as an
ideology and the circumstances of its use.
The circumstances of its use are political
circumstances, and each nationalism has
its own distinctive story. (Spencer
1990a:288)
A"1derscn and Spencer provide insights into the
roles played by elites in nationalism. For both
these authors, and others, intellectual and political
elites are the producers of nationalism. In 1974
Cohen recognised that elites manipulate ethnic
symbols and identification for political purposes.
Below, I shall provide a brief overview of the role of
particular elite individuals and organisations in
the 'production' of nationalisms in Nigeria.
Through this example, I hope to demonstrate that
ethnicity and nationalism are not discrete
phenomena, and that theories of the production of
nationalism, and the manipulation of ethnic
symbols of identification are equally applicable in
Nigerian national/ethnic politics, and elsewhere.
The politics of contemporary Nigeria has
been, and still is, dominated by ethnic factionalism
that has prevented centralised hegemonic rule.
Electoral politics has been continually dominated
by parties that draw their support from particulaJ
ethnic groups, in particular the Igbo, Hausa-Fulan:
and Yoruba. The stability and legitimacy of centra
governments has been dependent on support fron:
ethnic leaders at the regional and local levels (e.g
Bames 1986, Apter 1987). The civil war, eight
attempted or successful coups and continua'
political unrest can be linked to the relationshiI=
between ethnicity and the failure of centra:
political hegemony in Nigeria (see Cavers 1991).
It is possible to understand this as the
failure of nationalism due to the prominence 0:
"primordial sentiments" (Geertz 1973:302-306), am:
in particular, ethnicity. However this superficia
understanding of the political situation in Nigeri~
depends on an artificial and unwarrantec
differentiation between ethnicity and nationalism
and would lead to a distorted representation 0;
Nigerian political culture. To illustrate this I wiI:
give a brief overview of the development oj
nationalist organisations in Nigeria, concentrat1n!
on three nationalists in particular, Obafem
.Awolowo,Nnamdi Azikiwe and Ahmadu Bello, anc
relating their development to ethnicity.
In 1923 Herbert Macaulay founded the
Nigerian National Democratic Party in Lagos, the
seat of colonial government. This was, ostensibl)
the first Nigerian nationalist organisation tc,
emerge (Awolowo1960:113). At this time colonia:
dominance was still being established in much 0;
the hinterland, and Nigeria was organised into th{
principality of Lagos, the Iboland Protectorate.
Yorubaland and. the Northem Region. Tht
organisation and degree of colonial rule differec
greatly between these regions and Nigeria could 1r
no way have been said to constitute a nation or ever:
a single colony.
Macaulay's organisation was based in Lago~
'..and represented .the rights of indigenous people
primarily within' Lagos. Support for the
organisation came almost exclusively fron:
privileged· urbano-NigerIans-who wanted to be'
integrated into the governmental apparatus of the
colony (Awolowo1960:114).
In 1934 the Lagos Youth Movement wa~
founded under the leadership of Emest Ikoli, Dr.
J.C. Vaughan and Oba Samuel Akisanya (Awolowc
1960: 116). The Lagos Youth Movement was
generally geared toWard Afrtcanisation of the civil
service and better, and higher levels schooling
within Nigeria. This organisation was quickly
renamed the Nigerian Youth Movement and
,produced a charter pledging to work for
independence within the Commonwealth, "the
development of a united nation out of the
conglomerate of peoples who inhabit Nigeria"
.(Awolowo 1960:121), economic equality and
progress for the people, and to oppose
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discrimination (Awolowo1960: 121-123).
The structuring of the charter reveals that
those who drafted it and led the movement were
elite urbanites. Most of the reforms that they were
interested in were concemed with advances in
higher education. including indigenes in
govemmental positions and improving the state of
workmen and encouraging local industries
Awolowo (1960:121-123). Considering that the
majority of the population had little or no
European style education. and relied on farming for
their subsistence. the charter could not have been
aimed at mobilising these people.
All of the leaders of the NYMwere urbanites
(Awolowo 1960:152) and had British style
educations and most were Yoruba (Awolowo
1960: 132). A considerable number of the major
leaders of the Nigerian Youth Movement were
involved in Newspapers published IIi Lagos. This is
interesting in light of Anderson's stress on the
importance of print media in the production of
nationalism (1991). Primary among these was
Emest Ikoli. the editor of the Nigerian Daily
Telegraph, the major paper critical of the colonial
govemment (Awolowo 1960:82). Shortly after its
founding The NYMbegan to publish The DaUy
Service as an official mouth piece (Awolowo
1960:89).
In 1937. Nnamdi Azikiwe. an Igbo. retumed
to Nigeria after being educated in the United States.
first at Storer College (Azikiwe 1970:chapter 5).
then at Howard and Uncoln University earning his
Doctorate and working as an instructor in political
science at Lincoln University (Azikiwe
1970:chapters 6 and 7). Prior to his retum he was
already considered. the most promising Nigerian
nationalist.
Upon his retum he joined the NYM and
began printing his own newspaper. the West Aftican
Pilot (Jones-Quartey 1965: 137). The perception. on
the part of some of the prominent members of the
NYM.that the Pilot was competing with the Daily
Service brought about conflict between Azikiwe and
Emesi ikoli. Chief H.O. Davies. CWef S.L. Akintola
and Obafemi Awolowo (Hatch 1970:235).
Resentment between these men and their supporters
increased as Az1k1wepublished columns that were
critical of NYMactivities (Awolowo135-145).
Tensions reached a peak when in 1941.
Azikiwe supported Akisanya against Ikoli. who was
supported by most of the NYM leaders in a
by-election. Azikiwe accused the other leaders of
being opposed to Akisanya's candidacy due to
anti-Ijebu (a Yoruba sub-group) and anti-Igbo
sentiments. Whether this was true or not, a rift was
created between the supporters of Azikiwe and 14
Akisanya and the supporters of Ikoli. Davies.
Awolowo (an Ijebu [Peel 1989:211-212)) and
Akintola during the hard fought election campaign
won by Ikol1. This rift ended with Akisanya,
Azikiwe and their Ijebu and Igbo supporters leaving
the NYM (Awolowo 1960:147-152, Hatch
1970:241-242. West Africa 1990).
As a result of the difficulties outlined above.
the NYMbegan to weaken in Lagos. However it
gained support in Yorubaland, particularly in
Ibadan where it was led by Obafemi Awolowo
(Awolowo1960:155-164. Hatch 1970:242). Azikiwe
then joined the Ibo State Union and shortly there
after formed the Ibo Federal Union with branches
in Nigeria and in London (Awolowo 1960: 165). In
part. these organisations were formed in response
to the perception by the Igbo. that they were the
victims of discriminatory policies that benefited
the peoples of other regions and the Yoruba in
particular (Azikiwe 1961 :242-253. Hatch
1970:242-243).
The Ibo Federal Union found support not
only from the general Igbo population but from
local associations that had been formed to provide
help for Igbo's who were in pursuit of higher
education. These associations were based on an the
Igbo ideology of independent success benefiting the
community as a whole. what Uchendu calls
"helping the town 'to get up'" (1965:34-38) . The
student. having received aid from local patrons
would in retum help members of the community to
seek positions and acquire benefits through his or
her advantaged position. In unifying these
organisations. the Igbo Federal union unified Igbo
throughout Nigeria. Azlldwe's position as a
nationalist then focused on advancing the cause of
the equality of the Igbo with the other peoples of
Nigeria and self-determination of the Igbo within a
federally organised Nigeria (Azikiwe1961:242-253).
In 1944 Azikiwe and Herbert Macaulay formed the
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. the
NCNC. as a political party (Furlong 1992:434). This
party originally claimed to be non-ethnic. however,
it is evident from electoral support that it remained
an Igbo dominated party. The extent to which this
party was an Igbo national party. rather than a
Nigerian national party is exemplified by Furlong's
quote of At.-tkiwe: --
In July 1949 for instance he stated that due
to their 'martial prowess. the God of Mrica
has specially created the Ibo nation to lead
the children of Mrica from the bondage of
the ages' (1992:441).
Azikiwe's nationalism used the rhetoric of
American nationalism and applied it to the
ideology and traditions of the Igbo. In a speech to
the Igbo State Union. Azikiwe states. "our native
political institutions are essentially democratic-
in fact. more democratic than any other nation in
Mrica. in spite of our extreme individualism"
(Azikiwe 1961:244) and uses "the right to life.
liberty and the pursuit of happiness" (Azikiwe
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1961 :244) to describe the goal of Igbo
self-determination. Part of the reason for his
selection of these characterisations is likely the
influence of his American education. however these
statements have been applied to his people by
several anthropologists and Igbo (e.g. Uchendu
1965.0lisa 1971. Chuckwukere 1971).
It is interesting that while Azikiwe
described the Igbo as democratic he had to resort to
a tradition that was an undemocratic anomaly
within Igbo traditions to legitimize his eventual
ascendancy as the primary leader of his people. The
position that he claimed was the legitimate
descendant of the first king of Onitsha. The
Onitsha. one of very few sub-groups within the Igbo
to have such a paramount inherited position
(Azikiwe 1970:1-16). A second claim made in the
pursuit of creating a united political front among
the Igbo is more clearly a fabrication. Azikiwe
claimed that the Igbo had been a united. strong and
independent nation prior to accepting the
protectorate of the British (Azikiwe1961:246-249).
It appears. contrary to this statement that a large
number of the groups that now identify themselves
as Igbo. did not do so until the tum of the century
(Uchendu 1965:3). This is not to say that they did
not share many cultural characteristics and forms
of social organisation.
While Azikiwe was establishing the
politicisation of the Igbo at the state level. Obafemi
Awolowo's Ibadan chapter of the NYM was
becoming dominant over the other regional
chapters to the extent that the NYMwas based
almost exclusively in Yorubaland (Awolowo
1960:155-166.
Hatch (1970:242). In 1944 Awolowo left
Nigeria to study law in London. where he organised
the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. the descendants ofOduduwa
(Awolowo1960:165-166). The stated purpose of the
Egbe Omo Odlldlll"a was to unite the Yorubawithin a
federal state. As Awolowostates: .
[WlhUst there was an Ibihio Union and an
Ibo Federal Union. there was no comparable
all-embracing union for the Yorubas. Since
the strength of a chain is that of the weakest
link. I thought it would be in the interest of
the federal unity of Nigeria if one was
founded. The Yoruhas were a highly
progressive but badly disunited group. They
paid lip-service to a spiritual union and
affinity in a common ancestor-Oduduwa.
But in all their long history they had waged
wars against one another ... the younger
elements thought that the Yoruhas were
inferior to the go-ahead Igbo people. and
that whatever might be their past glories
they had become effete and decadent ... I
decided. therefore. to do all in my power to
infuse solidarity into the disjointed tribes
that constitute the Yoruba ethnic group. to
raise morale. to rehabilitate their
self-respect. and to imbue them with the
confidence that they are an important factor
in the forging of the federal unity of Nigeria.
(Awolowo1960:166)
Shortly after its founding in London.
chapters were established in Ibadan and Lagos.-and
eventually spread through Yorubaland (Awolowo
1960:168-180. Hatch 1970:243). In rallying support
for the Egbe Orrw Odudua, Awolowo called on a
unified past of glory that would be resurrected and
the symbolism of the common ancestor. Oduduwa.
that Yoruba saw as a central symbol of legitimate
authority an unity. The use of Oduduwa and the
mythic origin of all Yoruba from him at lie Ife
brought the On!of Ife. the most important symbolic
figure of political authority among the Yoruba.
from whom all other kings receive their authority.
into the national political scene on the side of the
Egbe OmoOdllduwa thus bringing it great symbolic
support (Apter 1987:494). Legitimisation through
heritage was also sought through the continued use
of the Oba's (Yoruba kings) blessings and
consultations and Chieftatncies became important
symbols of authority for Yoruba nationalists in the
politics of the Nigerian state. Interestingly. the
importance of chieftaincies over Oba's was not
inconsistent with traditional Yoruba political
organisationsin which Oba's could be deposed by
and were obligated to consult chiefs on political
matters. What changed in this new context was that
whereas prior to colonisation the Oba were
dependent on the chiefs for legitimacy among the
people. now the nationalists were dependent on the
Oba for legitimacy among the people. Extending
this ethnic association into national politics
Awolowolater formed the Action Group as a Yoruba
based political party. This party continued to use
Yoruba symbols and maintained its base of support
in Yorubaland into the 1980s as the renamed Unity
Party of Nigeria (Apter 1987. Peel. 1989).
--WhHe--southern -Nigeria had seen
nationalists. educated in Britain. and fully
integrated into the urban capitalist system that
came with colonialism in the south. move from an
attempted Western style nation-state nationalism
to nationalisms calling on the cultural heritage of
their ethnic groups. the situation in the north had
been quite different.
During the colonial period the major
regions of Nigeria were governed quite differently.
Whereas in the south. missionisation. economic.
and educational reorganization had been
considerable. the north was in many ways little
changed by the colonial experience. The Northern
Region was Changed in three significant ways. First,
the reorganization of trade routes in the south
toward the coast and away from trans-Saharan
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trade left the Caliphate of Sokoto in an
economically margtnalised state. Second. the use of
the disintegrating Caliphate of Sokoto's political
apparatus in Britain's scheme of indirect rule
reconsolidated and enlarged the range of the
Caliphate's dominance in the region under British
'control' (Johnston 1967:240-258). and maintained
the political authority of the Hausa-Fulani
Sarakuna (rulers) (Miles 1987:238). Third. the
degree to which the educational. political. and legal
institutions of the Caliphate were left intact caused
the people of the north to be ill adapted to dealing
with the Westemised political and economic
systems that dominated independent Nigeria. thus
disadvantaging them against the peoples of the
south. The recognition of this disadvantage was a
primary factor in nationalism in the north.
The primary nationalist figure in the north
during the colonial period was Ahmadu Bello. the
Sardauna of Sakoto. Bello was a direct descendent
of Usuman Dan Fodio (Bello 1962:239). the founder
of the Caliphate of Sokoto. and the leader of the
Jihad that consolidated Islam in the Hausa states
that made up the center of the Caliphate. unified the
Hausa states under one rule and extended their
power throughout the central Sudan (Johnston
1967). Bello was educated at a Muslim college in the
north. and came to lead his people by inheritance of
his political position (Bello 1962:20-34). As a
nationalist his claims to legitimacy were through
an ongoing tradition. however his major burden
was to extend loyalty to the Caliphate to the entire
Northem Region. Bello's nationalist policies and
his hopes for the future of the people of Nigeria were
expressed In terms of the Jihad (Paden
1986:551-552). The politics of the party he created
in 1951. the Northern People's Congress (later
renamed the Nigerian People's Congress and the
National Party of Nigeria) were intricately linked
to Islam (e.g. Hiskett 1984:285) and dominated by
the Hausa-Fulani sarakuna (Miles 1987:238), thus
maintaining an authority structure that had been
integral to the Hausa states for several hundred
years (Johnston 1967). Among many of the
Muslims of the north and the among the Hausa (not
all of whom were. or are. Muslim). this consolidated
Bello's position as a leader. however for those who
were neither Muslims nor Hausa It was ineffective.
particularly among the large minorities of the
middle belt such as the Tiv (see Cavers 1991. e.g.
Nkemdirim 1975:110-111). Thus like Awolowoand
Azikiwe he could only unite those that shared an
identity with a common tradition.
As Nigeria moved toward unification under
independent rule this use of pre-existing bases of
ethnic specific hegemony became entrenched in the
political parties that were formed by these three
nationalists. regardless of attempts to make them
pan-Nigerian. non-ethnic parties. In the federal
elections of 1959. Nnamdi Azikiwe's National
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons gained an
overwhelming majority of votes in the Igbo
dominated east. Ahmadu Bello's Nigerian People's
Congress. originally the Northern People's
Congress. won overwhelming support in the North
and Obafemi Awolowo'sAction Group won an easy
majority in the Yoruba dominated westem region
(Idang 1973:71). In this election. and later elections.
the majority of support that was given to 19 parties
outside of the region's of their origin was from
regional minorities that were played off against the
dominant groups (see Cavers 1991:34-46).
In Nigeria. then. central hegemonic rule has
failed not because atavistic ethnic sentiments have
prevented nationalism. but because the tools of. and
conditions for nationalism were readily apparent
and accessible within the cultures and social
organisations of ethnic groups. none of which were
dominant enough outside of their region to suppress
the others. I expect that this is the case within states
where there are developing nationalist sentiments
and hegemonic central rule. however. the
importance of the ethnic origins of these
nationalisms do not make themselves readily
apparent as they are not opposed by major
competing nationalisms as in Nigeria. Therefore.
we tend to concentrate on nationalism in these
states as unique from ethnicity. As the example of
Nigeria demonstrates. theories and methods used in
the study of nationalism can be applicable to
ethnicity. The study of the invention of tradition.
the role of elites. media and educational systems in
the production or politicisation of nationalist
sentiments. the use of symbols and
essentialisations in creating a homogeneous
identity among heterogeneous populations could all
be further studied fruitfully in the context of ethnic
politics in Nigeria. Further. the study of
nationalism can benefit from the investigation of
ethnic heritage and "primordial sentiments" (Geertz
1973). as it is likely that just as in Nigeria. political
and intellectual elites of nations throughout the
world rely on ethnically based symbols. heritage.
ideals, and sodalorganisaJJons in their
nationalist causes. Thus we should not limit our
fields of analysis by artificially separating
nationalism and ethnicity as distinctly different
orders of phenomena. By doing so we may neglect
ideological, cultural and socio-political
continuities that are reinterpreted in new
situations. We also run the risk of neglecting
theories and methods that may be applicable to the
analysis of the politico-cultural phenomena
discussed.
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